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Michael Reisman**
"This theory is designed only for the
special case of a nearly just society."
John Rawis
From the standpoint of the disengaged observer, the
most overwhelming feature of social systems is the integrality
and the seamless symbiosis of controller and controlled. But
for certain problems, inquiry about legal control must dis-
tinguish the flow of behavior which comprises group life from
those specialized institutions which purport to-control, in
diverse ways, what that flow of behavior ought to be. The
specialized institutions--and they are not limited to the ap-
paratus of the state--convey, both for themselves and for their
targets, a very complete picture of how the group in question
ought to be acting: a picture of the group as its members
would like to imagine it and to some extent do imagine it.
Membership in the group involves for most1 acculturation, a
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1. Most, but not all. Even the most general and funda-
mental postulates of a culture may be held by different mem-
bers with varying degrees of intensity. A psychopathic or
sociopathic personality seems to learn the external forms but
there is no accompanying sense of rightness and hence no possi-
bility for autopunitive mechanisms, a most effective method for
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profound shaping of the personality, in processes which im-
part that preferred picture and make it an integral part of
the identity and cognitive structure of the individual. That
picture includes the official code of the group and much of
its distinctive ritual. 2
The picture produced by control institutions does not
correspond, point for point, with the actual flow of behavior
of those institutions in the performance of their public func-
tion: indeed, there may be very great discrepancies between
it and the actual way of doing things. The persistent dis-
crepancies do not necessarily mean that there is no
that in those sectors "anything goes," for some of those dis-
crepancies may conform to a different code. They may indi-
cate an additional set of expectations and demands which are
effectively though often informally sanctioned and which guide
actions when they deal with "the real world." Hence we en-
counter two "relevant" normative systems: 3 one which is sup-
posed to apply and which continues to enjoy lip service among
elites and one which is actually applied. Neither should be
confused with actual behavior, which may be discrepant from
both.
policing group uniformity. Marginal group members and "minor-
ities" are distinguished by their multiple acculturations and,
hence, a certain capacity for a more "objective" view of the
official picture of the group.
2. Where an operational code deviates from a myth sys-
tem, part of the support which will be necessary and demanded
will be collaboration in suppressing information about the ex-
istence of the code. As great a challenge to the integrity of
the code as the muckraking journalist is the "squealer" or
"stool": someone who tells the truth to myth system advocates.
A part of the sanctioning system of the operational code is
directed against precisely these actors; the expectation of
sanction serves to police loyalty.
3. And perhaps more, for each segment of the control
process may have its own operational code. Lawyers entering a
particular judge's court for the first time are struck by the
extraordinarily different ways the rules may be applied there;
to all intents and purposes there is a different code. A pro-
test to the judge that what he is doing is a violation of the
rules of procedure is not likely to be successful: "This is
the way it's done in my court." Similarly, someone beginning
to work in a government office will be told that "of course
they're the rules, but this is the way we do things here."
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A disengaged observer might call the norm system of
the official picture the "myth system" of the group. Parts
of it provide the appropriate code of conduct for most group
members, and for some most of it is their normative guide.
But there are enough discrepancies between this myth system
and the way things are actually done by key official or effec-
tive actors to force the observer to apply another name for
the unofficial but nonetheless effective guidelines for be-
havior in those discrepant sectors: the "operational code."
Bear in mind that the terms "myth system" and "operational
code" are functional creations of the observer and are not
synonyms for the actual flow of official behavior or the of-
ficial picture. The cynic who delights in nihilistic exer-
cises would say there is no law. But from the perspective of
an observer, as we shall see, parts of the myth system and the
operational code comprise the law of the community. From the
perspective of many actors within a given social process, how-
ever, only myth system is law; hence operational code activi-
ties are perceived as "illegal" and profoundly wrong.4
The locus classicus of myth systems and operational
codes is probably the Code of Hammurabi, a massive casuistic
4. A brief and necessarily superficial note on ethno-
linguistics. Different strata and lay and specialist groups
use the same terms differently. Where the terms are normative-
ly charged,the different uses indicate different codes and pos-
sibly different authoritative decision processes. Unless one
believes that words have inherent meanings, one must accept that
divergent uses are equally meaningful in their social contexts;
one is not more correct than another.
In this regard, note that the popular use of the term
"illegal" may be different from the specialist use of the term.
Specialists will often pull rank and insist that a situation is
"legal," hence appropriate for their expertise and insist on
using their definitions. In myth system and operational code
tensions, operators may answer popular charges of "illegality"
by explaining patiently that what is being done is technically
"legal." The social observer however should be careful not to
be overawed, for the popular meaning or "misunderstandings" can
be an important indicator of the social perspectives of a key
group in the process. Which meaning and hence which value al-
location becomes dominant depends, of course, on the disposi-
tion of authority and control in the context. But rejected
meanings continue to be important social and political factors,
indicating degree of group integration and of resistance to im-
plementation as well as the type and likelihood of future con-
flicts.
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code ostensibly designed to guide decision makers of the an-
cient Babylonian empire in a wide range of their official
activities. There is substantial reason to believe that
Hammurabi's Code was never applied; those charged with and
those sdeking decisions from officials operated on the basis
of an entirely different code of norms. 5 However, the Code
of Hammurabi should not be dismissed as irrelevant, for inso-
far as it expressed key values of the elite and the society of
the time, it may have influenced behavior and even the formu-
lation and application of the operational code.
In other studies, my colleagues and I have urged schol-
ars to reserve the word "law" for those processes of decision
which are both authoritative and controlling.6 The fact that
people operating within social systems do not speak with such
precision is one of the reasons why we have discrepancies be-
tween myth system and operational code. The point here is
that much formal law, which community members continue to
view as law and which they are not willing to dismiss as "sur-
vival" in River's sense of the term,7 will not only not be
effectively enforced, but its violation will be accepted by
those charged with operating it as the way things are done.
Problems can erupt when those not privy to the operational
code become aware of its practices and begin to test them
against the standards of the myth system. New strata may be
gaining political power or a counter-elite may be in the pro-
cess of accomplishing a take-over. One might say that these
new groups simply do not "know the rules" (or that cynical
politicians assume that their constituents don't know the
rules). One would predict that in the course of time they too
will learn an operational code discrepant in varying ways from
their own myth system.
5. See generally 1 G. Driver & J. Miles. The Babylon-
ian Laws (19-52). For a more extreme position, see Finkelstein,
"Ammisaduqa's Edict and the Babylonian 'Law Codes,"'
J. Cuneiform Stud. 91 (1961).
6. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The World Constitu-
tive Process of Authoritative Decision," 19 J. Legal Ed. 253,
403 (1967), reprinted in I C. Black & R. Falk, The Future of
the International Legal Order 73 (1-96-9T. See also idem. "rhe-
ories about International Law: Prologue to a Configurative
Jurisprudence," 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 18ui (196"u).
7. Rivers, "Survival in Sociology," 6 Soc. Rev. 295
(1913).
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I. Public Systems of Private Law
Certainly there is nothing startling in the hypothesis
of multiple legal systems, in the proposition that within
larger, conglomerate groups all small groups have and, indeed,
are characterized by their cwn normative codes. Insofar as
they are organized as groups--kin, racial, religious, language
and dialect, sgecialist and so on--they must have their own
legal systems. What is distinctive about the operational
code is that it is a "private public law" in systems in which
public law is supposed to be public. It is a system in which
those authorized to play control functions and those who deal
directly with them come to accept procedures, which deviate
from the myth system, as licit or lawful. George Washington
Plunkitt, the doyen of machine politicians, once submitted a
flagrantly unconstitutional bill in the New York Legislature.
When an opponent stigmatized its unconstitutionality, Plunkitt
is reputed to have replied: "What's a constitution between
friends."
Elites in a power process are those who have more power
and influence than others. Their assumption--a varying mixture
of self-service and community service--that they bear special
responsibilities generates the feeling that they may and some-
times must take certain liberties. Because their function, as
they perceive it, is to maintain group integrity, they will
"have the courage" to do what is necessary to achieve that ob-
jective, but to suppress it in the interests of the community
and the very integrity of the myth system which has been vio-
lated by their operations. Surely the most venerable formula-
tion of this view is in that handbook for the erstwhile elite,
Plato's Republic. In Book V, Socrates remarks coolly:
. . . our rulers will find a considerable
dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for
the good of their subjects . .9
The exclusiveness of this elite prerogative is made patent in
Book III:
if anyone at all is to have the
privilege of lying, the rulers of the
State should be the persons; and they,
in their dealings either with enemies
or with their own citizens, may be al-
lowed to lie for the public good. But
nobody else should meddle with anything
of the kind; and although the rulers
8. Pospisil, "Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal
Systems in Human Societies," 11 J. Conflict Res. 2 (1967).
9. V Republic 459.
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have this privilege, for a private man
to lie to them in return is to be deemed
a more heinous fault than for the patient
or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak
the truth about his own bodily illnesses
to the physician or to the trainer, or
for a sailor not to tell the captain what
is happening about the ship and the rest
of the crew . . .10
Of course, the elite rationalization of its operational code
presents extraordinary opportunities for abuse. In constitu-
tional democracies it short-circuits the very controls on of-
fice-holders which are at the heart of popular constitutional
government. Elites who are regularly involved in these sorts
of defections develop new though often secret justifications
derived from historicism, mythical communions with the
volksgeist, charismatic authority or validating vibrations
from the Silent Majority.1 1 The convenient rule of interpre-
tation for the Silent Majority is, of course, that silence is
assent: hence Homer's dead host never fail to confirm the
politician who invokes them. The style of justification may
vary; the persistent generation of the operational code does
not. I would hypothesize that it is a by-product of social
complexity, generated by the increase of social divisions and
specializations. All foci of loyalty have, by definition, at
least the rudiments of a normative code. Those specialized to
the manipulation of power have their "operational code." In
the power context, it is a private system of public law.
II. Popular Responses
In systems in which government is generally unpopular
in certain sectors or is viewed as a benefice which can be pur-
chased and then used as a business, the privacy of the opera-
tional code is not at all startling. Nor, for that matter,
would the privacy of the elite's operating procedures in a
privately held corporation be deemed startling. It is only
when the decision process holds itself as being public and
popularly based that accounting for decisions by public pro-
cedures becomes a characteristic feature. With this develop-
ment, tensions increase between the myth system of the group
and the operational code of those charged with or directly
concerned with decisions. Effectiveness of the operational
10. III Republic 389.
1I. See generally K. Popper, The Open Society and its
Enemies Chap. 6 (19-4"iTT
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code as well as group cohesion will then depend on the com-
parative secrecy with which the code is practiced and, in par-
ticular, the insulation of those strata or individuals insuf-
ficiently "sophisticated" to appreciate its necessity or in-
evitabi lity.
"Legality" may be taken to refer to conclusions by mem-
bers of the community of the propriety of practices determined
by some system of logical derivation of the myth system. Vir-
tually all of the operational code discrepant from the myth sys-
tem is thus "illegal." "Lawfulness" in contrast may be taken
to refer to conclusions by members of the community of the
propriety of practices in terms of their contribution (or lack
thereof) to group integrity and continuity, of which the myth
system is part. 12 Conclusions of lawfulness are teleological
rather than logical and will vary according to time, context
and group need. Many parts of an operational code may be
deemed lawful at certain times, though the conclusion of law-
fulness does not thereby integrate them into the myth system.
In a society committed to meritocracy, an operational code of
old boyism might be unlawful, while an operational norm of af-
firmative action to aid a disadvantaged minority might be
deemed lawful. Both would be illegal. Whether an appropriate
social goal is to secure conformity of myth system and opera-
tional code, i.e. to police or to abrogate that for which there
is no intention to police is a question with its own complexi-
ties.
Precisely because of the discrepancies between myth sys-
tem and operational code, maintenance of the myth system is a
dynamic process requiring ongoing contributions from many.
Some obscuring of the operational code is consciously designed.
"Not surprisingly, the ideological approach to politics and
government is encouraged by the politicians themselves, who
would much rather portray themselves as motivated by principle
than by power or personal profit."] 3 For some who may be gain-
ing few benefits from the operational code, commitment to so-
cial order is held at levels of consciousness so deep they are
unaware of them. The social philosopher who elaborates a the-
ory, as John Rawls puts it, "designed only for the special case
12. I propose to use the word "licit" to characterize
bribery which is prohibited by the formal code but which is
accepted as "ok" by operators. Licit may be deemed to be
synonymous with "lawful" and may also be distinguished from
"legal," the latter being a conclusion based on logical deri-
vation rather than teleological or consequential reasoning.
13. M. Tolchin s S. Tolchin, To the Victor: Political
Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House 9 0971)-.
19771
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
of a nearly just society" substitutes a rosy dream world for
the violence and often savagery of political struggles. In-
tellectual efforts of this sort basically reinforce the myth
system and obscure the operational code.1 4 Similarly, the
economist, equipped with the inimitable proviso of ceteris
paribus, neatly insulates himself from the operational code,
and many other aspects of reality. The contribution of law
professors, with the brief interlude of the legal realists,
needs no comment.15
Every belief system has a coercive component but the
apparatus for imposing "evils" or deprivations for deviations
from orthodox belief may not be obvious. For example, the
potential characterization of eccentricity may be enough to
deter the more timid but nonetheless reflective members of a
group from verbalizing their perceptions or deductions of the
mythic quality of the formal normative code. More serious vio-
lators may be solemnly declared insane by the custodians of
group sanity. 16 Such characterizations neutralize the devi-
ants and at the same time reinforce the accepted version of
reality for the rest of the group. Public and prominent sup-
porters of the myth system, in contrast, may often expect
material rewards as well as the warm sunshine of approbation
from those who would believe the myth system and find public
confirmations reassuring.
Where there are discrepancies between myth system and
operational code, elites, as I have remarked, have a strong
incentive to conceal those activities, acceptable under the
code, and to maintain the integrity of the myth system. For
a member of the larger public, not privy to the rules and
practices of the operational code, the result i's a picture of
"reality" which at certain disturbing moments is seen not to
be reality but rather a vast production. In Book VII of the
Republic, Socrates' extraordinary myth of the prisoners in the
cave is evocative of prisoners of the myth system.
And now, I said, let me show in a
figure how far our nature is enlightened
or unenlightened:--Behold human beings
living in an underground den, which has
a mouth open towards the light and reach-
1-. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 363 (1971) and see
the very perceptive comment on this point by Simson in his re-
view of Rawls' book, "Another View of Rawls' Theory of Jus-
tice" 23 Emory L.J. 473 (1974).
15. See, for example, T. Arnold, The Folklore of Capi-
talism (1937T.-
16. T. Szaz, Ideology and Insanity 218-245 (1970).
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ing all along the den; here they have
been from their childhood, and have their
legs and necks chained so that they cannot
move, and can only see before them, being
prevented by the chains from turning round
their heads. Above and behind them a fire
is blazing at a distance, and between the
fire and the prisoners there is a raised,
way; and you will see, if you look, a low
wall built along the way, like the screen
which marionette players have in front of
them, over which they show the puppets.
I see.
And do you see, I said, men passing
along the wall carrying all sorts of ves-
sels, and statues and figures of animals
made of wood and stone and various mater-
ials, which appear over the wall? Some of
them are talking, others silent.
You have shown me a strange image, and
they are strange prisoners.
Like ourselves, I replied. 17
Few things in life are authentically unilateral and deception
is often a shared process. While elites have an obvious in-
terest in maintaining the integrity of the myth system, key
personalities and entire strata in the public may abet the de-
ception, avoiding the truth like someone pulling blankets over
his head to avoid the cold reality of dawn.
But support for the myth system is not exclusively be-
nign, voluntary, verbal or symbolic. Coercive efforts, as we
have seen, may be regularly mounted by those comprising the of-
ficial apparatus to police belief in and behavior in accord with
the myth system by sanctioning, according to some rationale, de-
fections from it. Efforts directed to policing beliefs may be
even more urgent when there are widely _perceived discrepancies
between myth and operation.'8 Policing is not exclusively hier-
archial, a specialist function, or elite-initiated. Many group
17. Republic, Book VIII, at 773-774.
18. See generally S. Ranulf, Moral Indignation and
Middle Class Psych 193, 964). See also A. Hochman,
Marijuana and Social Evolution 169-ff. (T972).
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members who believe the myth may contribute to policing it,
gaining in addition a certain ratification in the simple
skill of "knowing the rules."l Thus, in addition to the
more patently coercive elements of the elite, teachers, clergy-
men, parents, even a stranger on the street may patiently ex-
plain to a youngster why a certain act should not be done.20
Despite such efforts, there may be a point where dis-
crepancy between myth and operational code becomes so great
that either part of the content of the myth system changes, be-
lief in it wanes or crusades for reassertion of the myth burst
forth. In group life as in personal life, erosion of the myth
system is most serious and underlines the vital though in-
tangible function the myth system performs. Belief in the myth
system is a critical part of group organization, the basis for
mobilizing many necessary collective activities. Because It
has been transmitted, through acculturation, to the core or-
ganization of the individual personality, a waning of belief in
it, without a replacement, may lead to anomie and personal dis-
integrations. It may also lead to struggles between groups--
classes, castes, religions, language and dialect groups and so
on--for one aspect of war, as McLuhan and Fiore observe, is the
mobilization of the self to protect images of reality challenged
by others.
• all social changes are the effect
of new technologies (self-amputations of
our own being) on the order of our sensory
lives. It is the shift in this order,
altering the images that we make of our-
selves and our world, that guarantees that
every major technical innovation will so
disturb our inner lives that wars neces-
19. J. Piaget, The MoralJudgment of the Child (Babain
trans. N.Y. 1965).
20. As virtually any post-mortem of a failed effort at
social change reveals, informal modes of acculturation are ex-
tremely important. In an earlier note, I had occasion to ob-
serve that "Cultures as well as civilizations must find ways of
instilling components of the social code which are not appro-
priate for direct discourse. Often a way must be found to pro-
vide dramatic illustrations of how people balance the "do's" and
"don't's'2 of group life in those dynamic situations which seem
so much more complicated than the normative code. Stories
[folktales] can be a particularly useful social carrier .
"Folktales and Civic Acculturation: Reflections on the Myths of
Dinkaland" in F. Deng, Dinka Folktales: African Stories of the
Sudan (1974).
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sarily result as misbegotten efforts to
recover the old images.
2 1
Whether the common technique of "diabolization" of an opponent
is a product of intergroup tensions or a cause of them, it un-
derlines a struggle of contending myth systems in which op-
ponents protect, inter alia, their own idols.
Anomie here does not mean that an individual no longer
knows hc to behave in specific settings, but that he has lost
more general guidelines for orientation and valuation of his
environment. It is this coordinate personal mooring function
of the myth system which drives the very individuals who may
behave in many settings according to an operational code dis-
crepant from the myth system nonetheless to defend with extra-
ordinary passion the myth system itself.
Perception of a routinized code discrepant from the
myth system is not restricted to the elite. Groups, particu-
larly large conglomerations, are composed of many smaller
groups. The culture of some of these smaller groups may have
unique perspectives on the more general myth system and oper-
ational code, for to an extent members of these sub-groups may
find it easier to apprehend the myths of the larger group as
"facts." Perhaps because of this, some members have become
specialists in the performance of certain operations for the
larger group. But operators are not necessarily outsiders.
Phrases such as "you've got to be practical," "take a more
realistic view," "in the real world" or "the nitty gritty" are
usually signals of operators who identify with the myth but
perform group functions according to a discrepant operational
code. Obvious domestic examples in official behavior might in-
clude the activities of intelligence agencies and certain
police functions e.g. dealing with informers by paying money
or reducing sentences, the practice of patronage and so on.
More arresting examples might include running undesirables out
of town or police execution of miscreants in vigilante actions.
To characterize activities such as these as "unlawful" would
not be illogical yet somehow it would be imprecise and incon-
gruous, for the activities are carried out by the minions of
the law and may be routinely supported by judges charged with
the supervision of criminal justice processes.2 2 They do in-
21. M. McLuhan & Q. Fiore, War and Peace in the Global
Village 4 (1968).
22. The Justice Department's investigation of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency's 20-year old program of opening mail
in transit between the United States and Communist countries
supplies us with a telling example. Despite the fact that un-
der Federal law, tampering with first-class mail in this coun-
try is a criminal offense, the Justice Department lawyers have
1977]
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deed deviate from the myth system, and those who perform them
defer to this fact by performing them in a covert or "discreet"
fashion. 2 3 Of significance here is the fact that those who
perform them view them as lawful under the operational code.
There are, to be sure, special dangers in following
these informal and uncodified practices. It is always possible
for reformers, some political opponents, or counter-elites to
prosecute belatedly these defections from the myth system; the
defense of operational code obviously will not then avail.2 4
When, as we shall see, there are myth system purges of opera-
tional code practices, the practitioners will often stand to-
gether and try to thwart the effort. Even if sanctions are im-
posed and new prescriptions are made to prevent the practices,
it is likely that the practicewill nonetheless continue if
those who control them conclude that they are necessary for
group life. 25
recommended against criminal prosecution of CIA officials in-
volved in the mail opening operations. See Crewdson, "Inquiry
Is Said to Oppose Prosecuting CIA Aides,'Tr-N.Y. Times, July 27,
1976, at 1; idem. July 30, 1976, at A20 (editorial).
23. While "secrecy" may be used to refer to serious ef-
forts to conceal from all others practices deemed to be wrong
and even sanctionable, "discretion" may be used to refer to the
concealing of practices which though discrepant from the myth
system are known to be widely done and most infrequently sanc-
tionable. In Connecticut until recently, "law-abiding citizens"
broke the law by buying and selling contraceptives in pharma-
cies; let us refer to this practice as discreet rather than
secret. The use of discretion indicates a tension between myth
system and operational code, but not necessarily unlawfulness.
24. There are circumstances in which unanticipated so-
cial or legal-institutional changes suddenly render effective
or practicable norms which theretofore had been strictly mythic.
For example, much of the "code" of consumer protection law was
ineffective until changes in class actions and the development
of public service type advocacies began to allow real effec-
tuation. Defendants, relying in the past on the unlikelihood
of application, could now hardly defend with the exceptio
"This law was never made to be applied." Perhaps it is sig-
nificant that effective decision makers responded in part by
attenuating the opportunities for class actions and reducing
official funding for public interest advocacy.
25. Attempts to regulate or control the transnational
practices of U.S. based corporations will be confronted by
this condition. Many commercial operators believe that con-
formity with foreign standards and practices, which may in-
clude bribery, is absolutely necessary for commercial success.
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Operators, if pressed, will defend the operational code
as self-evidently necessary for organizational efficiency, even
survival. Enough of those concerned with appraising or policing
lawfulness will accept such justifications to make behavior ac-
cording to the operational code feasible. A legislature may
pass a very open-textured statute to give increased discretion
to those charged with applying it, after being told in execu-
tive session that some things just "have to be done" and it
would be better for all if less were said about it. Legisla-
tors may avoid investigating certain sectors or during inves-
tigations carefully refrain from asking certain key questions.
Prosecutors, using their broad discretion, will decide not to
press forward with investigations and prosecutions against cer-
tain types of official behavior: mail openings, gift exchanges
and so on. Judges will accept suggestions from secret agencies
that the national interest would be served best if a certain
case were quashed. Journalists will not report certain
things.2 6
What is characteristic of the operational code is that
it is shared by key members of the control apparatus, that its
deviations from the myth system are selectively tolerated and
depend on the contingency, the identities of agents and objects,
the purposes of the act and the probable effects on the larger
organization. There is no attempt to revise the myth. On the
contrary, efforts are made to maintain the integrity of the
myth and to suppress the existence of the operational code.
The justification of the discrepancies expressed in the opera-
tional code is that organizational efficiency and survival re-
Consider the following recent study.
An executive of a chemical firm sums up this
point: "I believe that American companies must
comply with the commercial modes of the coun-
tries in which they do business or forget trying
to do business in certain countries. The com-
petitive consequences of not complying would,
in many cases, make it impossible for the Amer-
ican company to complete certain transactions.
I have found that business people from most of
the major exporting countries do not hesitate
to meet the conditions required to do business."
The Conference Board, "Unusual Foreign Payments: A Survey of
the Policies and Practices of U.S. Companies," by James R.
Basche, Jr., Report No. 632, 1976, at 28.
26. See generally, J. Reston, The Artillery of the
Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy 20-22, 30-31
(1966).
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quire it. Hence in a type of casuistic reasoning, the opera-
tional code is not a violation of an oath to serve an organiza-
tion, but rather the ultimate affirmation of that loyalty. But
the violations of group myth also create intense complicities
and loyalties among the operators, for they are a type of
blutkit, generating an ancillary code of silence, like the
Mafia's Omerta.2 7 Hence one outcome of the discrepancy be-
tween myth system and operational code is the sharpening dis-
identification of elite and rank-and-file and the increasing
identification of elites.
II. The Elite Response
La Rochefoucauld's famous apothegm that "hypocrisy is
the homage vice pays to virtue" should not obscure the point
that homage is owed, and that something should be paid. How
much is to be paid is a question of key political importance.
Elites are operators and are certainly acquainted with dis-
crepancies from the myth system; more important, they are well
aware of the utility (to themselves, and perhaps in rational-
ized form, to "the system") of the particular practices of the
operational code. When popular disquiet grows, they will re-
spond in ways which reinforce belief in the myth system, but
often with a planned inefficiency. Some responses are uncom-
fortably obvious. For example, after a recent revelation of
campaign fund abuses, Congress heroically cleaned house by,
inter alia, shortening the statute of limitations on the of-
fenses involved from five to three years.2 8 Other responses
are more beguiling in their complexity. The so-called lex
imperfecta, "imperfect law" or "law without teeth" is often a
conscious operator or elite design for dealing with aggravated
myth system and operational code discrepancies. Where pre-
scribed norms are clear but an otherwise effective administra-
tive process has not established adequate enforcement mecha-
nisms, has staffed them with exquisite incompetents, has per-
mitted those enforcement mechanisms to atrophy or, as Key's
examples show, has insulated certain activities from the reach
of an enforcement mechanism,29 we are probably encountering a
discrepancy between myth system and operational code. The
late Alex Rose remarked: 'To put people in law enforcement
27. On Omerta see F. lanni & E. lanni, A Family Busi-
ness, Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime 34-35
28. 2 USC §455.
29. V. Key, The Techniques of Political Graft in the
United States Yl-T ,3-39(unpub lished doctoral disserta-
tion,University of Chicago, 1934).
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for the purpose of non-enforcement is a very big attraction
for politicians." 30
In some instances, the imperfect law may have been de-
signed for cynical motives; for example, to permit operators
to do what rank-and-file are still prohibited from doing or
to discharge, via the legislative exercise, popular dissatis-
factions with certain public behavior.3 1 In other cases, a
subtly crafted imperfect law may be a way of restoring confi-
dence in certain discredited institutions or practices. Con-
sider, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
established after the great market crash of 1929. A market in
which those with substantial liquid capital can lend to those
who wish to use it in productive enterprises is indispensable
to a capitalist system. But the market cannot work without re-
assurances to investors that the economic system is productive
and that producers are being candid and accurate in revealing
how they will use the money and what returns can be reasonably
expected. Both of these expectations were dashed in 1929, but
apparently restored after the legislation and subsequent ad-
ministrative activity in 1934. There are reasons to doubt
that the SEC, as time-structured, staffed and budgeted, can
really police the market,32 but it performs its function if it
creates the expectation that it can, in the minds of potential
investors. To carry it off effectively, it is vital that the
30. Tolchin & Tolchin, supra note 13 at 12.
31. A recent example may be the 1976 draft of a code of
guidelines for multinational corporations prepared by the OECD.
See Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development.
"International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,"
Declaration by the Governmentsof OECD Member Countries, De-
cisions of the OECD Council on Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, National Treatment, International Investment In-
centives and Disincentive Consultation Procedures Declarations
of June 21, 1976. Bus. Week (June 14, 1976, at 43) asserted
the code "has rubber teeth when it comes to enforcement." A
similar journalistic characterization was given to the Ford Ad-
ministration (S.R. 3741) and the Proxmire drafts (S.R. 3664)
dealing with bribery abroad by U.S. corporations. See Time,
June 28, 1976, at 58.
32. See R. Chatov, Corporate Financial Reporting (1975);
Stizler, "Public Regulation of the Securities Market," 37 J.
Bus. 117 (1964); Friend & Herman, "The S.E.C. Through a Glass
Darkly," id. at 382; and Benston, 'The Effectiveness and Effects
of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements," in H. Manne
(ed.), Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securi-
ties 23-(1969).
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bulk of the policers in the SEC profoundly believe in their
cause, constantly and honestly gripe about the inadequacy of
their budget and staff, criticize superiors who are too1political" (i.e. see the larger picture) and cause periodic
shake-ups.
In some cases, the Imperfection Is genetic, built into
the very structure of the law in question. Sometimes the im-
perfection is blatant. Consider a 1975 amendment to the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act. 33 In order to assist the Direc-
tor of ACDA in the performance of his duties, any government
agency preparing legislative or budgetary proposals with re-
gard to the general area of armaments and military facilities
shall, on a continuing basis, provide the
Director with full and timely access to
detailed information, in accordance with
procedures established . . . with respect
to the nature, scope, and purpose of such
proposal.34
The information gained may be shared with appropriate Con-
gressional committees to aid them in the performance of their
function.3 5 The final subsection of the amendment adds, al-
most as an afterthought,
No court shall have any jurisdiction
under any law to compel the performance of
any requirement of this section or to re-
view the adequacy of the performance of
any such requirement on the part of any
Government agency (including the Agency
and the Director) .36
When Solon gives with one hand and takes with the other, he
uses lex imperfecta.
A cognate species of lex imperfecta, performing a func-
tion similar to the imperfect law, is a legislative exercise
33. Section 146, P.L. 94-141: 25 U.S.C. 2576.
34. Subsection (a).
35. Subsection (b) (3).
36. Subsection (c). This provision cannot be taken as
merely shifting enforcement from the courts to the Executive
Branch. The genesis of the amendment was the Inability of
ACDA, a comparatively small agency, to secure data from that
Goliath of Government, the Department of Defense. The amend-
ment could be meaningful only if its Implementation were to be
shifted from the Byzantine politics of the Executive Branch
where the fact that ACDA had already been bested gave rise to
demands for new law, to a more equalizing arena such as the
courts. But see Berdes, Congress' New Leverage, 9 Center Maga-
zine, No. 4, at 76 (1976).
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which produces a statutory instrument apparently operable, but
one which neither prescribers, those charged with its ad-
ministration, nor the putative target audience ever intend to
be applied. We might call this a lex simulata. The prototype
Is the Code of Hammurabi. One way of identifying such laws is
by the absence of meaningful travaux preparatoires or legisla-
tive history. If the context is one In which legislative
bills adverse to the interests of the target group are ordi-
narily contested, but the particular bill is unchallenged,
the difficulties or costs of applying it to hard or to mar-
ginal cases are not raised and so on, it is not unreasonable
to assume that no one ever intended it to be applied.
Where such laws are "legislated," they are akin, in
function, to the flying buttresses of a gothic cathedral;
they seem to support parts of the myth system, from which the
operational code deviates unambiguously and routinely. That
apparent support can be most reassuring to diminutive mortals
looking up at those massive walls. The function of the legis-
lative exercise is not to affect the pertinent behavior of
the manifest target group, but rather to reaffirm on the ideo-
logical level that component of the myth, to reassure peri-
pheral constituent groups of the continuing vigor of the myth
and perhaps even to prohibit them from similar practices. As
elsewhere, the mere act of legislation functions as catharsis
and assures the rank and file that the government is doing
what it should, viz. make laws. Legislation here becomes a
vehicle for sustaining or reinforcing basic civic tenets, but
not for influencing pertinent behavior.
An amendment In 1971 to the Internal Revenue Code3
8
would appear to be a salient example. Under the Code, deduc-
tions are not allowed for a domestic Illegal bribe 'Which sub-
jects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of license
or privilege to engage in a trade or business," but, the Code
continues, "only if such State law is generally enforced."
The enforcement proviso permits a tax authority or federal
court to temper application of the law prohibiting deductions
for bribe payments by a consideration of the operational code
actually prevailing In that commercial sector. But regarding
bribery of foreign officials no such proviso exists. Sec.
162 (c)(1) provides:
No deduction shall be allowed under sub-
section (a) for any payment made, directly
or indirectly, to an official or employee
of any government, or of any agency or in-
strumentality of any government, if the pay-
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ment constitutes an illegal bribe or kick-
back or, if the payment Is to an official
or employee of a foreign government, the
payment would be unlawful under the laws of
the United States if such laws were applicable
to such payment and to such official or em-
ployee. The burden of proof in respect of
the issue, for the purposes of this para-
graph, as to whether a payment constitutes
an Illegal bribe or kickback (or would be
unlawful under the laws of the United States)
shall be upon the Secretary or his delegate
to the same extent as he bears the burden of
proof under section 7454 (concerning the bur-
den of proof when the issue relates to fraud).
Prohibition of deduction of bribe payments to foreign offi-
cials applies (1) even if the foreign law making it Illegal is
not generally enforced and (2) even if it is lawful according
to the foreign law.3 9 This is a standard so pure that one
doubts that it was any more than pious aspiration, without in-
tention to control. From the period of its enactment to the
current antibribery crusade, I have been unable to find cases
of prosecution.
Another example of lex simulata is offered in the amend-
ments to the Export Control Act of 1965.40 Amidst agitation
for greater U.S. resistance to the Arab boycott, a bill was
submitted prohibiting compliance by U.S. business. 4 1 When op-
position was mounted, the prohibition was diluted to require
only a report to the Deportment of Commerce that a boycott re-
quest had been received.42 The report would go to the Secre-
tary of Commerce "for such action as he may deem appropri-
ate."43 The form which was actually prepared by the Depart-
39. In many ways, the entire prohibition of deductions
for illegal bribes may be viewed as a simulation. My col-
league Boris Bittker believes that the sanction is ordinarily
so minimal as to have power neither to deter nor to act as an
incentive for self-correction. Indeed, where legislation is
supported by ludicrously mild sanctions, the total effect may
be to communicate that there is no real official intention to
change behavior.
40. Export Control Act §2 (4)(B).
41. See Hearings to Amend Section 2 of the Export Con-
trol Act of 19749, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) before Subcomm.
of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency.
42. 15 C.F.R. §369.
43. Export Control Act, §3 (c).
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ment of Commerce indicated that respondents need not answer
whether they actually complied with the Arab boycott request;4 4
hence few respondents answered this key question. 45 One stu-
dent of the legislation remarks, "The official opposition to
the Arab boycott was essentially ritualistic, and the sup-
posed deterrent effect of the reporting requirement was negated
by the decisions not to require an answer to the critical ques-
tion and to keep the completed forms confidential." 46 What
then was the function of the legislative exercise? To assuage
those who felt that U.S. law was being violated by the Arabs,
to affirm opposition to boycotts of other governments and to
create a bureaucratic process which seemed to implement the
policy but which allowed business to continue as usual: lex
simulata.
Lex imperfecta and lex simulata, in their very ineffec-
tiveness, express and reinforce the essential distinction be-
tween myth system and operational code. There is, to be sure,
a measure of cynicism. In many cases, however, the discrepancy
between myth and code, captured by lex imperfecta and simulata,
is cul.tivated and created in good faith, as a way of retaining
fidelity to fundamental social values, and not, as would first
appear, out of sheer hypocritical homage to virtue. Here, as
elsewhere, the inquirer must accept the complexity of events,
the multiplicity of inconsistent normative codes within a
single functional legal system, the demands for behavioral
accommodation and the continuity of contradictions. The fact
that individuals, including realistic operators, in some or
even all cases breach a certain norm does not mean that they
wish to terminate it. On the personal level, the self-
Initiation of ritual penance for breach of a norm by an in-
dividual even while he knows that, in comparable circumstances
in the future, he will breach the norm again, provides us with
a telling example. While we cannot here enter into examination
of the guilt dynamics which give rise to such rituals, it is
clear that one of their major functions is to restore on both
social and personal levels, commitment to the norms.47
This is an important dimension of the discussion and, at
44. See "U.S. Exporter's Report of Request Received for
Information ertlflcation or other Action Indicating A Restric-
tive Trade Practice or Boycott Against a Foreign Country, Form
la-1014, reprinted in 3 Lowenfeld, International Economic Law:
Trade Controls for Political Ends 470 (1977).
45. Lowenfeld, at 116.
46. Id., at 126.
47. Wa-lzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty
Hands," 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 160 (1973).
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the risk of repetition, I would emphasize that my thesis is not
one of nihilism or the hypocrisy which so delights the cynic.
On the contrary, The concept of operational code does not mean
that everything is lawful, or that, In Ivan Karamazov's an-
guished words,"everything is permitted." There will be much
that remains unlawful and effectively sanctioned by the appro-
priate community processes. Operators know that some discrepan-
cies from the myth system are licit and will be tolerated;
others will not. In other words, determining the "law" or the
socially proper behavior in a particular setting necessitates a
much wider social inquiry than the simple consultation of the
formal law; it may be myth system.
From the perspective of general members of the community
who are not privy to the operational code of the specialist
group, some operational code activities may well seem unlawful.
But often, there will be a certain toleration or a desire for
ignorance. A number of writers have studied "dirty work" in
society and have noted the coordinate generation of ignorance
when It must be performed.4 8
There is, then, a symbiotic relation between myth sys-
tem and operational code, the latter providing a degree of sup-
pleness and practicality which the myth system could not achieve
without changing much of its content9 Hence in extended per-
iods of social stability, the discrepancy between myth and
practice will tend to be stable and even institutionalized.
Unless one puts a special premium on stability per se, this
does not mean that every aspect of the operational code con-
tributes to group weal, that some Invisible hand directs a
complex but nonetheless euphonious social symphony. From the
perspective of community goals expressed in the'myth system or
deduced by a disengaged observer, much of the operational code
may be profoundly dysfunctional during these and other periods.
Indeed, parts of the operational code may be designed to ac-
cord special benefits to elite members while other parts may
take on a blutkit character, making elite membership permanent
and irrevocable by participation in a taboo act. 50 Many other
48. See generally E. Hughes, Good People and Dirty
Work, Social Problems 10 (1962); Coser, "The Visibility of
Evil," Journal of Social Issues 25(1969). See also in this
regard the intriguing remarks of Walter Mondale in "Nobody
Asked: Is It Moral," Time, May 10, 1976, at 32, 34, col. 3.
49. Some reasons for the differential rates of change
are examined with regard to territorial title in Chen &
Reisman, 'Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title,"
91 Yale L.J. 599, 601-03 (1972).
50. See Alexander, "War Crimes and their Motivations,"
39 J. Amer. Inst. of Crim. L.J. 298 (1948).
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practices which deviate from the myth system serve to protect
the entrenched position of subgroups e.g. a system of rewards
based on old-boyism or caste or ethnic ties Instead of merl-
tocracy, protective practices in professional groups and so on.
On the other hand, during periods of rapid social change,
discrepancies between myth and practice will be more unstable.
Accommodations and rationalizations ordinarily provided by
culture and general past practice will be less available,
obliging each individual to make choices for himself. The same
sense of comparative rulelessness and anomie often experienced
In periods of relative stability by individuals or groups who
are suddenly changing social position now becomes a more gen-
eral experience, Imposed on many who never sought change and
who were willing to foreswear its potential rewards in return
for a routinized "peaceful" environment in which the ambit of
choice was narrow. For very independent persons, these can be
times of great opportunity; but for those who seek guidance and
validation from their environment, these are times of height-
ened anxiety and often desperate searching for new leaders and
meaningful rectitude systems.
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